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American Indian Occupation of Alcatraz

Breaking Point: The 1969 American
Indian Occupation of Alcatraz Island
Thomas Kahle, Coe College
Introduction
On November 10, 1969, a young Mohawk Indian named
Richard Oakes stood thronged by San Francisco news reporters
and television cameras. The location of this media frenzy was the
then-abandoned Alcatraz Island, and Oakes, a tall, dark-haired
twenty-seven-year-old was pressed against the side of a pick-up
truck answering reporters’ questions. “So what’s this ‘nation’ that
you want to establish out here?” was the first question audible
over the crowd’s ruckus.1 Oakes replied, “An Indian nation.”2
The next inquiry, “[Well] why Alcatraz?” was received with equal
brevity, as Oakes, struggling to contain his confidence, subtly
grinned as he remarked: “Because everyone can see it.”3 Then,
while answering another question concerning the soon-to-bebuilt “Indian nation,” Oakes found himself interrupted by one of
the reporters: “Mr. Oakes, this is Mr. Hannon from the General
Services Administration (GSA).”4 Recognizing the significance of
the crowd’s newest and rather serious-looking member, Oakes
exclaimed: “Mr. Hannon, hi! I have a proclamation that I’d like
to read to you.”5 In less than five minutes, Oakes read the GSA
representative a document entitled “The Alcatraz Proclamation
to the Great White Father and His People” a statement whose
condemnation of U.S.-Native American relations was as
noteworthy as its claim that Alcatraz now belonged to a group
called “American Indians of All Tribes” (IOAT).6 Mr. Hannon,
who chewed gum and nodded along as if to expedite the speech,
posed the following query after being handed Oakes’ statement:
“So, Richard, what are your plans now?”7 When Oakes shrugged
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and replied, “I guess we can go home,” Mr. Hannon quipped
at the young Mohawk, “Need a lift?”8 Oakes, not masking his
satisfaction, beamed and responded: “Sure do!”9 Grinning as
the crowd dispersed, Mr. Hannon likely thought that he had
just witnessed the end of a publicity stunt dubbed a day later
as “Alcatraz’s Indian Invasion.”10 Unbeknownst to the GSA
representative, November 10, 1969, proved to be just the
beginning of one of the most monumental protests in Native
American history. The protest ushered in a decade of indigenous
activism and marked the end of decades of silent confusion,
dejection, and frustration.11
In the late hours of November 20, 1969, less than two
weeks after Richard Oakes proclaimed the founding of a new
“Indian nation,” two boats deposited approximately eighty
Native American men, women, and children onto Alcatraz.12
The island’s “Indian Invasion,” which Bay Area reporters had
interpreted as a media “gimmick” just ten days prior, was fully
ablaze and soon characterized by powwows, national television
coverage, and a nineteen-month stand-off with the U.S. Coast
Guard. The events of November 10, while perhaps amusing
to Mr. Hannon and San Francisco news crews, were anything
but an impulsive “joke” to the fourteen Bay Area students who
orchestrated the return “invasion.”13 “We were obsessed with the
idea of taking Alcatraz,” remarked Al Miller, a military veteran
and Seminole Indian, who, in 1969, was serving as vice president
of San Francisco State University’s Student Coalition of American
Natives (SCAN).14 Along with Oakes, who had been voted
SCAN’s president, Miller and the twelve other Indian students
who envisioned the island’s settlement belonged to a “new urban
generation” of Native Americans.15 Harvey Wells, a member of
this new generation who led three hundred Indians onto the
island, offers the first of many revealing insights regarding the
occupiers: “I guess we got our idea [i.e. reclaiming Alcatraz] from
[older Indian leaders], but they were reluctant to operate in this
manner…We just decided that it [was] time for us to govern
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[our own] destiny.”16 This decision to assert Native Americans’
autonomy over their own livelihood stemmed, in other words,
not from the impulses of a few irritated college students, but
from sentiments long-present in Indigenous communities.
As the above statements indicate, the students who
organized Alcatraz’s November 10 takeover, as well as many
of the Indians who followed them back onto the island ten
days later, had become “fed up” with what they perceived as
the federal government’s ongoing and “publicly sanctioned”
abuse of American Indians.17 Although Oakes was civil in his
meeting with Mr. Hannon, John Trudell, a Sioux Indian who
emerged as one of the takeover’s primary spokesmen, captures
the sentiment of the occupiers best: “To put it mildly, we were
pretty upset.”18 “Upset” was indeed an understatement of the
occupiers’ disposition, and Trudell, commenting as if to ensure
that the American public would not mistake IOAT’s motivations,
asserted in June 1971: “We were tired of the last fifty years [of
government treatment]…Someone mentioned to me that
America has an Indian problem. America doesn’t have an Indian
problem, Indians have an American problem.”19 The “American
problem” that Trudell alludes to is, to say the least, a complex
one, rooted in centuries of Native American mistreatment by the
federal government.20 Although the exploitation of American
Indians constitutes an expansive area of study, an analysis of the
inspirations for Alcatraz’s takeover and their intensification in the
years prior to 1969 is both feasible and this paper’s objective.
In examining the underlying grievances responsible
for Alcatraz’s 1969 occupation, it is worthwhile to consider
the takeover’s logistics as well as the historical discourse that
has surrounded the event. With regard to the occupation’s
organization, Alcatraz’s November 10 takeover was not the first
instance where the island became the subject of Indigenous
controversy.21 On March 9, 1964, five Sioux Indians occupied
Alcatraz for four hours, claiming the Rock on the basis of the
Sioux Treaty of 1868.22 Citing a treaty provision which held that
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any surplus federal property would revert back to Native American
ownership, the occupants attempted to obtain Indian rights to
Alcatraz in federal court only to have their case struck down.23
The idea of reclaiming the island was resurrected in 1969 by the
Bay Area college students, who, in the wake of an October fire
that destroyed the San Francisco Indian Center, saw an opportune
moment to begin building the “Indian nation” mentioned by
Oakes.24 Using the Indian Center’s destruction as justification for
seizing the island, the ’69 occupants argued that the former prison
could serve as a new Indigenous cultural campus, encompassing an
all-Indian university, spiritual center, ecology center, and vocational
rehabilitation program.25
While the seizure of Alcatraz would retain potent symbolic
power, it would not lead to permanent Indian possession of the
island. In November 1969, IOAT’s Thanksgiving celebration drew
some four to six hundred demonstrators to the island, but logistical
support and activist turnout steadily declined from winter 1970
to June 1971.26 Conjunction between the U.S. Coast Guard and
General Services Administration (GSA), the federal agency then
entrusted with Alcatraz’s administration, worked effectively to
undercut the energies of the protest.27 In November ’69, the GSA
accused the occupiers of trespassing, a charge which the Coast
Guard enforced by cutting off utilities to the island a month later.28
This, as well as a partial Coast Guard blockade, left the occupiers
entirely dependent on donations, which surged in November and
December 1969, but then dwindled as the takeover faded from
front page headlines.29
By spring 1970, sustaining the takeover, let alone winning
title to Alcatraz, became exceptionally difficult for IOAT. Sporadic
access to food, water, and medical supplies undermined the
protestors’ cohesion, with confrontations breaking out between the
occupation’s architects and later arrivals.30 Oakes, accused of being
a “sellout” devoted to soliciting funds from white sympathizers,
distanced himself from the takeover following his twelve-yearold step-daughter’s death in January 1970.31 With the face of the
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occupation gone, activists such as LaNada War Jack and John
Trudell attempted to maintain some semblance of order and
continuity, negotiating with federal representatives and serving
as permanent members of an IOAT committee in charge of
the island’s day-to-day affairs.32 The U.S government, however,
remained firm in its refusal to relinquish Alzatraz, and talks
between the two sides went nowhere throughout 1970 and into
early 1971.33 Although always wary of government intentions,
the occupiers grew more convinced in the succeeding months
that federal authorities would seize any opportunity to end
their protest altogether.34 By the summer of 1971, only fifteen
protestors remained on the island.35

Alcatraz dock entrance during the Indian Occupation in 1970

Ultimately, a June 1971 fire brought the demonstration
to a close when it destroyed five of the island’s buildings and a
lighthouse.36 Citing the need to restore the lighthouse as well as
prosecute the supposed sale of six hundred and eighty dollars’
worth of copper wire from the island, the GSA employed thirtyfive U.S. marshals to remove Alcatraz’s remaining Indians on June
11, 1971.37 The marshals’ intervention effectively ended Indian
claims to “the Rock,” but could not erase the takeover’s success
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in capturing the nation’s consciousness.38 Innumerable American
Indian protests preceded Alcatraz’s occupation, but none received
the widespread news coverage of the Bay Area takeover did, a
disparity which historian Sherry L. Smith describes as Alcatraz
garnering “more attention than all the Indian struggles of the
[twentieth century] combined.”39
Grace Thorpe, a Sac and Fox Indian, Indigenous activist,
and daughter of the legendary athlete Jim Thorpe, describes
Alcatraz as “the most important event in American Indian
movements to date. It made me put my furniture into storage
and spend my life savings.”40 Although Thorpe’s sentiment may
not be representative of all Native Americans, historians Sherry
L. Smith, David L. Milner, Thomas King, Troy Johnson, and
Joane Nagel have understood Alcatraz’s ’69 takeover as perhaps
the “catalyst” or “turning point” in twentieth century Indian
activism.41 Smith, in particular, points out that, amid antiVietnam War protests, clashes between college students and law
enforcement officials, and the Black Civil Rights Movement,
Native Americans existed “well below the radar screen of [1960s]
national consciousness.”42 Emerging in an era when the federal
government seemed determined to eliminate Indian tribes as
“legal, political, and cultural identities,” the Alcatraz takeover,
according to Milner, may be viewed as a kind of “clarion call” for
a more confrontational and sustained period of native protest.43
As King explains, the events that the ’69 occupation ushered in
(which are commonly grouped under the moniker “Red Power”)
brought national attention to the harsh realities of “Indian [life
and] country.”44 Native activists’ 1972 seizure of the federal
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the 1973 occupation of the
town of Wounded Knee, South Dakota, for instance, profoundly
“struck a chord” with non-indigenous Americans who had already
grown weary of the American War in Vietnam.45 According to
Johnson and Nagel, the American public, which had become
captivated by images of overmatched Indians carrying hunting
rifles against armored carriers at Wounded Knee, needed to look
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back only two years to understand the genesis of the unfolding
Indian insurgency.46 “[It] all began on Alcatraz,” is the consensus
of the aforementioned historians, who view the ’69 takeover
and the events that followed as forcing the American public to
contemplate, or at the very least, acknowledge, twentieth century
Indians holding firm to their cultural identity.47
By contrast, historians Bradley Shreve, Carolyn Strange,
Tina Loo, and Paul Rosier contextualize Alcatraz in a larger
history of Indian activism, and in doing so, challenge Alcatraz
as the genesis of twentieth century Indian resistance. Shreve,
for example, mentions that highlighting the ’69 takeover as
the commencement of the Red Power Movement obscures
how Indigenous activists followed in the footsteps of earlier
generations.48 Broadly expanding on this point, Strange and Loo
stress that “Indian discontent and mobilization for change” did
not begin with Alcatraz but “had been brewing for a decade prior
to the occupation.”49 Likewise, Smith, albeit generally, claims that
Indigenous frustration was especially made manifest in Northwest
Pacific Indians’ fight for fishing rights in the 1960s, a struggle that
was gradually turning national attention to the plight of American
Indians, only to have Alcatraz “secure” that attention in 1969.50
Ultimately, however, these historians offer only a limited analysis
of the takeover’s roots in earlier decades.
Altogether, the inspirations for Alcatraz’s occupation
and are referenced but hardly explained in these historical
narratives. The Indian frustration responsible for the Alcatraz
takeover emerged amid a pervasive challenging of American
politics’ “status quo,” and thus remains shrouded by the broader
upheaval of the 1960s.51 As Rosier explains, mid-twentieth
century Indigenous activists, Black Civil Rights leaders, feminists,
and labor organizers all reacted against American Cold War
conformity, while being indiscriminately grouped together.52 Yet,
Alcatraz’s occurrence in an era characterized by Black Power, the
Chicano Movement, feminism, and Third World Liberation Front
strikes should not hide the deeper roots of specific Indian
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grievances, for Alcatraz was anything but an “accident.”53 In fact,
the occupation’s conception came from a combination of longdeveloping motivations and the spirit of the age, and, as such, is
better seen as the breaking point for twentieth century Native
American activism, rather than a starting point.54
With contemporary scholarship largely glossing over the
’69 takeover’s inspirations, this paper explicitly identifies Alcatraz
as the culmination of Native American grievances specific to
mid-twentieth century Indigenous welfare. In particular, it
argues that the motivations which drove the occupation derived
from the socio-economic status of Native Americans and the
struggle of Indigenous peoples to maintain their culture of
“Indianness.”55 Alcatraz’s occupiers, in effect, viewed destitute
Indian reservations, their “termination” through 1950s federal
policy, and the relocation of Indigenous peoples in urban areas as
being at the very center of Native American social and economic
woes. Meanwhile, they attributed the dying of Indigenous
culture to a white American society that was, at best, indifferent
to the survival of Indian lifeways. Imbued with these convictions,
Alcatraz’s Indian occupiers administered “the Rock” in a manner
that prioritized the flourishing of Indigenous customs while
dismissing white American influence. All this considered,
recognition of the Alcatraz occupation as simply the moment
which roused Native Americans to protest their treatment by the
federal government is, in effect, shortsighted.56 Alcatraz’s 1969
takeover not only marks the beginning of an era of confrontation
towards the status of Indigenous peoples, but the climax of
twentieth century American Indian discontent.
In explaining Alcatraz as the culmination of Indian
disgruntlement, this project draws on a wide range of primary
source materials. First are thirty-seven Native American newspaper
articles written between 1960 and 1971 and archived on the
Newberry Library’s American Indian Histories and Cultures
Database. A valuable insight into Indian sentiment regarding
the socio-economic status of Native peoples as well American
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government and culture, these articles are used to gauge the
attitudes of indigenous peoples both in the lead up to and during
the Alcatraz occupation. Second, six government censuses and
surveys as well as two series of BIA relocation records are used
to assess the social status of twentieth century Native Americans,
conveying the hardships of Indigenous communities both before
and during the ’69 takeover. Third, thirty-four news footage
broadcasts, nearly all of which contain interviews of the Alcatraz
occupants, have been attained via San Francisco State University’s
Bay Area Television Archive. In addition to providing visual
references of an Indian-administered Alcatraz, these broadcasts
reveal the occupiers’ motivations for taking the island and their
translation into the Rock’s Indigenous government. Finally,
publications of the Alcatraz Indians of All Tribes newsletter and
an additional fifty-two participant interviews serve a purpose
similar to that of the broadcasts. These interviews have been
attained through various sources: the University of New Mexico’s
American Indian Historical Research Project; the Doris Duke
Oral History Project at the University of Utah; Troy Johnson’s
The American Indian Occupation of Alcatraz Island: Red Power and
Self-Determination; American Indians, a compilation of primary
and secondary source materials pertaining to Indigenous studies;
The Thunder Before the Storm: The Autobiography of Clyde Bellecourt
as told to Jon Lurie; Heather Rae’s 2005 documentary, Trudell;
a 1994 interview of Wilma Mankiller conducted through the
University of Washington-Seattle; a 2017 interview of LaNada
War Jack conducted through the California Historical Society;
War Jack’s “Reflections of Alcatraz” published in the University
of California-Los Angeles’ Gathering Native Scholars; and, lastly,
the 2014 documentary We Hold the Rock and Footage World, an
online library of stock media footage.
As Milner, Johnson, Nagel, and King have noted, the ’69
takeover “effectively ended” long before U.S. Marshals forced
the remaining occupants off the island on June 11, 1971.57 In a
manner ironically mirroring centuries of white-Native relations,
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national news and Bay Area reporters insisted on designating
“spokesmen” for the occupation just as European colonists
demanded that Native tribes delegate “chiefs” or “chieftains.”58
As already referenced, the occupation faltered when later arrivals
of activists verbally and physically confronted those Indians
who had planned the early stages of the takeover and had since
been declared its leaders by the media.59 LaNada War Jack, John
Trudell, Al Miller, Adam Fortunate Eagle, Stella Leach, Joe Bill,
Ed Castillo, Ross Harden, and, of course, Oakes himself (the
so-called “mayor of Alcatraz”) were among those who the press
repeatedly interviewed concerning the occupation’s planning
and sustainment.60 Consequently, the voices of these participants
are disproportionately heard in the takeover’s coverage as well as
in the scholarly literature that has since followed. Yet, this fact
and there being no definite record of the number of Indians
who passed through occupied Alcatraz, does not render these
individuals’ testimonies any less valuable.61 The aforementioned
activists were, after all, the occupation’s original organizers
and many played central roles in the island’s administration.62
Rather, it is simply unfortunate that the experiences of so many
of the occupiers have never been recorded, as activist Peter Blue
Cloud once remarked: “We [i.e. the occupiers] came everywhere
from reservations and urban settlements, government boarding
schools, street gangs, giant plains, and desert, horse people,
sheep herders, fishermen of the coastal rivers, [and] hunters of
the frozen north.”63 With these voices lost, this study and all
others concerning the ’69 occupation remain at a disadvantage
in capturing the Alcatraz occupation’s true nature: that of a
nationwide Native American movement composed of similar,
but also markedly distinct, peoples.
Lastly, discussion of the motivations cited as inspiring
Alcatraz’s 1969 takeover assumes an order which demonstrates the
emergence of a breaking point for Indigenous peoples. Offered
first are historiographical accounts of Indian reservations, federal
Termination policy, and the Employment Assistance Program.
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Following these are the Alcatraz occupiers’ opinions, which explain each
factor’s contribution to the ’69 takeover. Afterwards, a section devoted
to the dying of “Indianness” addresses another defining aspect of
1950s/60s Indian welfare. Attention is given to Black Power’s influence
on the occupiers before discussion turns to the BIA’s oversight of Indian
education, IOAT’s encouraging other Indigenous protests, and IOAT’s
implementing a “white ban” on Alcatraz. As before, historiographical
accounts of these events precede the Alcatraz occupiers’ opinions of
each. In the end, these sections aim to explain Native Americans’ social
and economic woes and frustration over their fading culture as creating
a “do or die” moment in the struggle to salvage Indian livelihood. It
was at this particular moment that Alcatraz’s occupiers acted with the
conviction that the very existence of Indigenous peoples was at stake.
Motivations Part I: Native American Homelands, Termination, and
Urban Relocation
In turning to the grievances that led to Alcatraz’s 1969
occupation, the socio-economic status of twentieth century Native
Americans first warrants consideration. First, discussion of the
Alcatraz occupiers’ frustration with American Indian welfare will
always entail some reference to the “special [pieces of ] land” known
as “reservations.”64 Established a full century before policies such as
termination and relocation, reservations constitute territories set
aside by the federal government to house Indians displaced by white
westward expansion.65 Although instituted as a kind of compensation
for tribes deprived of their ancestral homelands through fraud, theft, or
war, the often forcible grouping of Native Americans onto reservations
proved to be a “watershed experience for [Indigenous peoples], the
consequences of which proved devastating for Indian culture and
psychology.”66 As evidenced, the Alcatraz occupiers’ discontent over
the lack of social and economic mobility then available to Native
Americans tended to revolve around these tracts of land, be it in their
poverty, their “termination,” or Indians’ relocation away from them.
For decades, reservations’ remoteness kept “[Indigenous peoples] out
of sight and out of mind of…non-Indian [Americans]” in addition to
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one another.67 However, the diminishment of Indian homelands
and the movement of their inhabitants to urban areas eventually
concentrated the anger needed to make Alcatraz’s occupation
possible.68 By 1969, activists such as Joe Bill, an Inuit and central
organizer of the ’69 takeover, had come to the conclusion that “a
real understanding of the problems [facing American Indians]”
requires “living the life of an Indian,” an experience inextricably
linked to reservation life and the difficulties of escaping it.69
An understanding of reservations as a “breeding ground”
for the frustration behind the ’69 occupation begins with the
“uncanny resemblance” between the physical conditions present
on Indian homelands and those on “America’s Devil’s Island.70 In
“The Alcatraz Proclamation to the Great White Father and His
People,” the November 10 statement read by Richard Oakes, the
takeover’s organizers facetiously cited the following characteristics
as rendering the former prison “more than suitable” to serve as
another American Indian reservation:
1. It is isolated from modern facilities, and without
adequate means of transportation.
2. It has no fresh running water.
3. It has inadequate sanitation facilities.
4. There are no oil or mineral rights.
5. There is no industry and so unemployment is very
great.
6. There are no health-care facilities.
7. The soil is rocky and non-productive, and the land
does not support game.
8. There are no educational facilities.
9. The population has always exceeded the land base.
10. The population has always been held as prisoners and
kept dependent upon others.71
A rather frank and forthright critique of the conditions present
on American Indian homelands, the above “justifications” for
68
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taking over Alcatraz in particular stemmed from the fact that
nearly non-existent water supplies, health care facilities, schools,
and job opportunities had long constituted reservation life.72 In a
1935 survey commissioned by the South Dakota Relief Agency,
state labor and health inspectors ruled that nearly all of South
Dakota’s ten reservations existed in an “absolute state of want.”73
Characterized by schools that offered little more than a fifth grade
education, one-room tar paper houses without plumbing or
access to clean water, and a prevalence of disease described by the
commission as “dire,” these native communities were declared, to
little surprise, “wholly dependent on the state…for subsistence.”74
Yet, if these descriptions are not startling enough, it is one of
the survey’s initial statements that is perhaps the most alarming:
“Living conditions on these [South Dakota] reservations are
characteristic of those on most Indian reservations.”75 Of course,
this survey was not intended to address the conditions of the over
three hundred reservations then-present in the United States. Its
assumption that the “deplorable state of affairs” present on South
Dakota’s reservations could not be that different from the rest of
the nation’s reservations is, to say the least, disturbing.76
In retrospect, the findings of studies such as that of
South Dakota’s 1935 Emergency Relief Administration seem
hardly exaggerated. National surveys conducted in succeeding
decades attest to minimal socio-economic progress on
reservations, conditions which inspired activists such as Joe Bill
to remark: “We [Native Americans]…have been broken down
and separated [and] forgotten for the last seventy years!”77 For
IOAT, the widespread destitution of Indigenous homelands was
a resounding testament to the federal government’s neglecting
Indian economic woes and the lack of means needed to escape
them. Born into environments where Indians could supposedly
survive both financially and culturally, Alcatraz occupiers ranging
from John Trudell to Wilma Mankiller to Richard Oakes came
to view their takeover of the desolate Bay Area island as a fitting
representation of the barren lands more conducive to keeping
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Native Americans in poverty than removing them from it.
At the age of seventeen, John Trudell volunteered to
serve in the United States Navy, and was later stationed on a
destroyer along the coast of Vietnam. Although willing to joke
to interviewers that he made the right choice joining the navy
because the Vietnamese didn’t have any ships of their own,
Trudell never kidded about his motivations for enlistment: “The
only reason I [joined] the military was because I needed to get
away from where I was. It wasn’t about politics, patriotism, or
anything else – it was about survival.”78 Trudell grew up on the
impoverished Santee Reservation in Nebraska, where he lost
his mother at the age of six and failed to finish high school.79
Confronting the adversities of reservation life was, however, an
experience hardly unique to Trudell, as Wilma Mankiller also
wrestled with poverty on the Oklahoma Cherokee Reservation.
One of eleven children, Mankiller and her family relocated
to San Francisco in 1956 after having no food, electricity, or
plumbing on their Oklahoma farm.80 Despite the distances
travelled by Trudell and Mankiller, the experience of having to
overcome poverty on their homelands proved inescapable. As a
junior high student in the Bay Area, Mankiller felt surrounded by
“children from another planet” when she observed white school
children “[riding] bicycles…roller skating…[using] a telephone,
or [doing] all the things [we’d never done before].”81 Mankiller
terms what she and other relocated Indians experienced a “cultural
shock” that gradually transformed into an “awakening” when a
young generation of Native Americans began contemplating the
juxtaposition between reservation life and that of mainstream
America.82
For the Alcatraz occupiers, coming to grasps with
the seemingly endless disparities between reservation life and
comfortable urban living, a status which Indians more often
glimpsed than attained, proved to be a painstaking but wellunderstood process by 1969. As a child, Richard Oakes not only
spent time on the St. Regis Reservation in upstate New York,
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but also in Brooklyn where his father worked as an ironworker.83
Exposure to an abundance of wealth in New York City left a
young Oakes wondering if there was “something [he] could do
for [his] people [on the reservation].”84 Having no solution in
his youth, Oakes would carry this question to the Bay Area in
1968, where, joining other Indians, he would discuss why many
Americans could know materialism while Indigenous peoples
could not.85 The contrast between reservation poverty and the
prosperity present off Indian homelands was, in other words,
a dizzying experience for Alcatraz’s occupiers. However, only a
transition this disorienting could have produced a response of
Alcatraz’s magnitude as Mankiller explains: “All [Indian] tribes
have endured periods of upheaval…[but leaving the reservation
and participating in the occupation] was [itself ] a watershed
experience.”86
Although disorienting at first, relocation to urban
environments worked to heighten Trudell, Mankiller, and
other Alcatraz occupiers’ understanding of reservation poverty
by 1969. No longer internally wrestling with life on the “Rez,”
IOAT activists gradually developed the confidence to contest
reservation conditions outright, with one twenty-one year-old
Yakima occupier going so far as to denounce Indian homelands as
American “concentration camps.”87 LaNada War Jack, employing
less evocative language but possessing much of the same sentiment
as her Yakima counterpart, remarked that one of the occupation’s
major inspirations was the desire to “focus attention on [the fact]
that Indians on reservations throughout the nation…were living
in poverty and suffering great injustice.”88 War Jack’s comment
later found a voice in a collective statement issued by IOAT, which
described the Alcatraz occupiers as having grown “concerned” not
only about their “own livelihood” but about “what was happening
on the reservations.”89 According to Cree activist Linda Aranaydo,
the events taking place on reservations constituted none other
than “the destruction of what [cultural] identity Indians have
[left].”90 For Aranaydo, “white men” had “proved successful to
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a certain extent” in eliminating the Indian’s “sense” of him- or
herself as “Indian” by isolating Indigenous peoples in “prisoner
of war camps,” their own reservations.91 Alcatraz’s occupation,
however, represented an attempt to “salvage” that identity by
revealing reservations as “oppressive spaces” paralyzing “[Indians’
efforts] to rise economically as individuals.”92 Channeling this
thought, Alcatraz’s occupiers presented their cause as not only
ending the spatial and personal “division” that reservations had
created amongst Native Americans, but drawing attention to a
means of living rendering the Indian no more than a “useless
entity” both to him/herself and his/her community.93 The ’69
occupation, in other words, reflected both a weariness with
reservations’ lack of socio-economic development and the
cycle of impoverishment that such stasis produced. For IOAT,
ignorance of this cycle, especially among Indigenous peoples,
guaranteed that reservations would continue functioning in the
manner they always had: worsening Native American financial
woes and crippling Indians’ inability to effect their own cultural
and economic survival.
When Indian activists staked their claim to America’s Devil
Island in November ’69, they offered an unmistakable parallel to
the bleak plots of land where Indigenous peoples had been holed
up for generations. For nineteen months, Alcatraz’s occupiers tied
themselves to a rock as inextricably as other American Indians
found themselves bound to their reservations. The San Francisco
Bay island effectively became the axis around which IOAT’s
cause revolved just as reservations, regardless of Indian wishes,
constituted Indigenous “homes…heritages…and [everything
Native Americans had].”94 From IOAT’s perspective, reservations
were not working to preserve American Indian autonomy, but
isolating Indigenous peoples and denying them the resources
needed to ascend economically. In 1970, Navajo Indian and
Alcatraz activist La Rayne Parrish affirmed this position with the
statement: “A lot [of the occupiers] have experienced reservation
life; they know what it is like, they know what the feeling is when
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their parents have to live on [government] welfare, when they
have to depend on…government services, just for a job, just for
a livelihood to exist.”95 Indeed, some of the activists who have
become most synonymous with the ’69 takeover never lost sight
of their upbringings on reservations, ultimately carrying their
experiences with them into cities and onto Alcatraz itself.
Born figuratively and literally outside the consciousness
of non-Native Americans, the occupiers that Parrish describes
were raised in spaces that, by 1958, Soviet propaganda had
adopted in discrediting its rival superpower, claiming that the
U.S.’s management of reservations would lead to “the gradual
extinction” of Indigenous peoples.96 A rather bold statement,
1968 national surveys seemed to award credence to the Soviet
claim when they indicated that Americans were grossing $170
million from agricultural products and charging up to $0.75 per
board of lumber.97 These sales should have corresponded with a
substantial growth in wealth for the 764,000 Indians nationwide,
as lumber and agriculture comprised two of the primary industries
within reservation communities.98 Instead, as if to confirm a
Euro-centric stereotype that Native Americans were incapable of
embracing market capitalism, reservation agriculture accounted
for only $16 million of the $170 million grossed, while reservation
lumber sold at a paltry $0.18 per board.99 When asked to explain
these discrepancies, Indians themselves attributed this absence
of economic growth not to a failure to engage market forces,
but an inability to overcome factional divisions.100 The divisions,
sown into reservation life through decades of poverty, were the
result of Indians battling one another over what few resources
were available.101 Feeling compelled to abandon collective efforts
in favor of individual survival, generations of Native Americans,
including those responsible for Alcatraz’s occupation, found
themselves becoming further entrenched in an endless cycle of
impoverishment.102
By 1969, an upbringing in what some Indians termed
America’s own “concentration camps,” where poverty not only
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threatened individual welfare but communal unity, led War
Jack and fellow occupier Marilyn Miracle to assert that few
Alcatraz occupiers “just jumped in and joined [the takeover].”103
Rather, participation in the occupation represented “a lifelong
thing,” an inspiration that “came from way back, back from the
reservation.”104 Simply put, Indian frustration over impoverished
reservation conditions did not arise suddenly in the fall of 1969,
but had been kindling within the Alcatraz activists and other
Indians since childhood. In the later half of the 1960s, IOAT’s
members, although driven from their homelands in desperation,
succeeded in finding one another and channeling their anger into
a common cause. These activists, recognizing that all Indians
had endured decades of neglect and financial ruin, envisioned
a protest on America’s most infamous prison-island as a fitting
representation of the destitution which Indigenous peoples had
come to know so well.105
*****
While reservation conditions may have first stoked the
ire of the Alcatraz occupiers, it was the federal government’s
1950s Termination policy that further incensed American
Indians bonded together in urban environments. Broadly
defined, Termination was the federal government’s forced
assimilation of Native Americans into mainstream American
culture, be it legally, socially, or economically.106 Since 1934,
the tribal governments that administered reservations were
recognized as having some version of sovereign power over their
lands and tribal members.107 Congress, in other words, treated
Indian tribes as “domestic, dependent nations” possessing
everyday civil and criminal jurisdiction.108 These powers afforded
Indians the right to organize their own governments, legislate
and adjudicate, determine tribal membership, levy and collect
taxes, and oversee the development of Indigenous land.109 With
the advent of Termination, however, over a hundred Native
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American tribes were stripped of their title as “sovereign entities,”
exposing them to a host of federal regulations to which they were
unaccustomed.110 Primary among these were the application
of state, income, property, and sales taxes, and states’ ability to
assume control of reservation resources.111 In addition, Native
American tribes found themselves deprived of the “special
services” once administered by the federal government, including
health, education, and welfare assistance not available to the nonIndian population.112 Termination, in effect, rendered obsolete
the trust relationship that previously existed between tribes and
the federal government and afforded Native Americans some
degree of autonomy.113 From the early 1950s until 1970, Indians,
who had briefly been recognized as self-governing, were liable
to being treated no differently from any other citizen living in a
particular state.114
The emergence of Termination was, in many ways, a
continuation of the federal government’s almost century-old
policy of Indian assimilation, one which Indigenous activists
were condemning outright by 1969.115 As early as 1871, the
formal end of the “treaty period” between Indian tribes and the
federal government, Congressional factions began advocating the
disregard of tribal leaders.116 With this came calls to break up
tribal estates via allotting reservation land to individual Indians.117
In 1887, these pressures culminated in the Dawes or General
Allotment Act, which ordered the dividing of reservations into
individual plots to be farmed and owned by Indians.118 Had the
allotment policy been carried out successfully, it would have
ended the reservation system altogether, and individualized
relations between Indians and the federal government.119 Instead,
the Dawes Act’s efforts faltered when Indians were awarded barren
lands and given little instruction in farming.120 “[Land] hungry
white settlers” ultimately preyed upon Indian unfamiliarity
toward homesteading and wrested control of almost two-thirds
of Indigenous land, an event which the federal government
attempted to curtail via the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act
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(IRA).121 Although calling for an end to allotment and a return
to Indian communal or “home rule,” the IRA encouraged the
revitalization of tribal organizations only so far as it might lead
to Indians’ eventual assimilation.122 By the late-1940s, the notion
that strengthening tribal institutions might serve as “preparatory
steps” for assimilation had succumbed to congressional calls
for more rapid Indian integration.123 Termination, in effect,
emerged as the answer to these calls, replacing Native Americans’
jurisdiction over their lands with that of states’, and inspiring the
indignation of Indians who came of age in the policy’s aftermath.
The impetus for Termination and their subsequent
effect on the nation’s American Indian population stemmed
from a wide range of motives, albeit all contributing to what
IOAT perceived as a wholesale assault on Indian sovereignty.124
Rosier, for one, identifies Termination as an example of the
“Cold War imperative of ‘ethnic integration,’” arguing that
the congressional discourse surrounding it mirrored that of the
international standoff between the United States and Soviet
Union.125 In other words, congressmen spoke of Termination
as if corresponding with the American effort to “liberate the
enslaved peoples of the world,” peoples which “included Indians
‘confined’ in…socialistic environments [i.e. reservations].”126
Ulrich and Burt, meanwhile, consider Termination as resulting
from the emergence of a conservative bloc of western American
congressmen in the postwar era.127 In addition to viewing
traditional Indian communal structures as too similar to
“dreaded Soviet ones,” these congressmen were searching for
new sources of revenue amidst a tremendous economic boom
in the farming, stock raising, lumber, mining, manufacturing,
and service industries.128 Indian land, with federal protections
prohibiting its sale and subsequent development, found itself at
the forefront of congressional calls to be “properly taxed” as early
as 1944.129 By 1953, terminationist congressmen were frequently
referencing the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, which granted
U.S. citizenship to Native Americans, as warranting Indians’
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treatment as individuals rather than as members of discrete
social and political groups.130 For terminationists, the separate
governmental and land-holding status of reservations were a
violation of the very economic politico-economic system of
the United States; that is, one of individual property rights and
private enterprise.131 In the end, these attitudes culminated in
the federal government’s massive withdrawal from Indian affairs
and services, which, regardless of its true intentions, was hailed
by some congressmen as allowing Indians to enjoy the freedoms
of competing in an unfettered marketplace.132
Yet, while motives for Termination may have ranged
significantly among congressmen, the federal government’s formal
decision to revoke tribes’ sovereignty while discontinuing “special
services” for Indians was especially influenced by the low regard
with which the BIA was held.133 Shared in concert with the belief
that reservations were economically unsalvageable, criticism of
the BIA was largely financial and based on the premise that the
agency was tending to idle Indians.134 By 1946, the department
was popularly described as bloated “with personnel whose salaries
and travel expenses drain…the vast sums that Congress [already]
appropriates for…Indian tribes.”135 It was at this time that the
Senate Committee on Civil Service “zeroed in” on the BIA as
one of several federal agencies possessing an excess of employees.
The committee encouraged elected officials and the BIA’s own
commissioner, Dillon Myer, to describe the Bureau as needing to
“get out of the [Indian] business as quickly as possible.”136
Meanwhile, a series of blizzards which struck the Navajo
and Hopi reservations in 1950 provided the opportunity for
western congressmen to justify their claim that only states, rather
than Indians themselves, could properly manage reservation
resources.137 The blizzards proved so devastating that the affected
tribes required rescuing via airlift, a response which inspired
Congress to investigate the conditions which allowed for such
havoc to ensue.138 Upon finding that the Navajo territory had
housed an excess of 20,000 inhabitants, terminationists in
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Congress seized on the revelation and declared the Navajo and
Hopis’ situation to be indicative of Indian homelands at large.139
These congressmen argued, in effect, that no reservation possessed
the land base needed to support its population, and that any and
all rehabilitation efforts toward Indian land would prove futile.140
This argument, or “surplus population theory,” served to validate
western congressmen’s stance that Native Americans would only
find adequate work off their reservations, and that responsibility
for tribal land should pass into states’ jurisdiction.141 In 1953,
congressional consensus over BIA dysfunction and reservations’
economic futility culminated in House Concurrent Resolution
108 (HCR-108), which, in addition to existing legislation,
initiated what IOAT denounced as the unjustified passage of
some 2,595,414 acres of land out of Indian hands.142
While the National Congress of American Indians
(NCAI), the nation’s perhaps most formidable outlet for
Indigenous grievances, managed to halt the continuation of
Termination legislation in 1957, the widespread passage of land
out of Indigenous hands continued to rankle American Indian
sentiment throughout the 1960s.143 Prior to IOAT’s emergence,
the NCAI, in a 1960 letter to over four hundred constituents,
decried Termination as the “final negation” of what it considered
to be the federal government’s primary commitment to Native
Americans: “[Indigenous] education, in the broadest sense of the
word, and [the establishment] of an efficient educational agency,
devoting its main energies to the social and economic advancement
of…Indians.”144 Termination had, in the NCAI’s opinion,
worked to the complete opposite of this principle by allowing
for the removal of “already inadequate [Indian] resources,” of
which Native Americans themselves could be “the instigators and
planners.”145 At its conclusion, the NCAI letter declared that if
any means still existed to reverse the trend of “poverty and lack
of social adjustment which had [come to] dominate [studies of
Native Americans] for more than thirty years,” a National Indian
Commission needed establishing to protect Indian resources and
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Termination needed outright abandonment.146
In the nine years that separated the NCAI letter
and Alcatraz’s takeover, American Indian condemnation of
Termination not only persisted, but assumed an increasingly
antagonistic tone. Throughout the 1960s, the NCAI worked
within existing political systems to lobby the federal government
to reverse Termination.147 The organization’s 1957 success in
halting Termination legislation served to strengthen its conviction
that Indian reform could be affected by working in conjunction
with the government rather than protesting against it.148 In
1967, the NCAI went so far as to encapsulate this belief with
the statement, “Indians Don’t Demonstrate,” a remark pointedly
aimed at younger cohorts of Native Americans, who were not
only criticizing Termination, but the officials dictating Indian
policy.149 Poor reservation conditions, as well as Termination’s
diminishment of Indian land, were responsible for concentrating
these younger Indians in urban areas where their frustration and
confusion could coalesce. In what Indigenous historian Alvin
M. Josephy labels “termination psychosis,” Native Americans
displaced by reservation poverty or the federal government’s
attempt to terminate Indian homelands exhibited “an allpervading suspicion of government motives in Indian Affairs.”150
Trudell, Mankiller, and Oakes are just a few Alcatraz occupiers
who belonged to this class of Native Americans, experiencing
confusion and anxiety perhaps deserving of the term “psychosis.”
However, these Indians’ joint immersion in the Bay Area allowed
them to find one another, and, in doing so, embolden their
understanding of Termination’s motivations and their willingness
to demand the policy’s repeal.
In the lead-up to the Alcatraz occupation, LaNada War
Jack was one activist especially willing to confront Termination,
even losing her job in the process. Poverty on the Fort Hall
Reservation (ID) inspired War Jack’s relocation to the Bay
Area in 1965, after which she took a job alongside another
future Alcatraz activist, Lehman Brightman, at San Francisco’s
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American Indian Center.151 Although not personally spurred to
move by Termination, War Jack, while directing the American
Indian Center’s newspaper, became absorbed in a Bay Area
Indian community that had experienced the policy.152 Alongside
Brightman, who served as the paper’s editor, War Jack drew the
ire of the center’s older members when her publications began
“making too much noise.”153 Due to its criticizing Termination
and urban relocation, the center’s elder directors condemned
War Jack and Brightmans’s work as straying beyond the accepted
realms of petition and reform into outright defiance.154 While
fired for breaking an unspoken rule that “Indians don’t protest,”
War Jack and Brightman came to exemplify Wilma Mankiller’s
observation that “poverty without community is very different
from poverty where there is a group of people who share a…
common history…and some sense of responsibility for one
another.”155 Termination, to be sure, allowed states to assume
Native American land, and, in doing so, worked to thrust
already poor Indians into foreign environments. However, once
concentrated in these environments, Indians such as War Jack
and Brightman began to recognize Termination, like reservation
poverty, as a shared transgression among Indigenous people.
Many other Alcatraz occupiers, over the course of the
1960s, came to understand Termination as depriving Indians of
their already-limited land and resources. An adolescent Richard
Oakes, for instance, was observant of the palpable “fear” that set
in on the St. Regis Reservation after its inhabitants realized that
Termination could allow for their arrest, trial, and prosecution in
racially biased New York courts.156 Although a deeply “disruptive”
event in Oakes’s youth, Termination did not become a driving
force in the young Mohawk’s political life until bartending
in 1960s San Francisco revealed a host of stories regarding
Termination’s effect on “[Indian] communities…homes…
and families.”157 Much of the same applies to Adam Fortunate
Eagle, whose involvement in numerous Bay Area Indian
organizations facilitated his understanding of Termination as a
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masked government effort designed to “wipe out” reservations,
abrogate the remaining treaties between Native Americans and
the United States, and reduce funding for the BIA.158 Finally,
Wilma Mankiller’s exposure to the Bay Area’s atmosphere of
“social and political revolution,” which had “everybody [thinking
that] everything was possible,” also inspired her to reflect more
critically on Indian policy.159 Upon realizing that Termination
was none other than another “government [policy]…designed
to make sure that Indians…no longer kept [their] language…
cultural identity…and most importantly [their] land and natural
resources” Mankiller was left alarmed, and searching for an outlet
to express her dismay.160
In January 1970, the Alcatraz occupiers, then fully
immersed in the Rock’s takeover, issued a newsletter exemplifying
their recognition of Termination as not only a common Native
American experience, but one jeopardizing the welfare of all
Indigenous people. Claiming that ownership of the prison was
“but little to ask” from a government which had engaged in
centuries of “systematically stealing Indian lands…polluting air
and water…and ripping open the very bowels of the earth in
senseless greed,” the newsletter identified Termination as none
other than the most recent federal policy of “theft, suppression,
and prejudice” toward Native Americans.161 In doing so, the
newsletter resembled earlier Native American critiques of
Termination, particularly that of the 1960 NCAI letter, as
threatening Indian livelihood. However, the publication’s
use of the terms “stealing,” “prejudice,” and “senseless greed”
illustrate a distinct shift in rhetoric, one that perhaps manifests
itself most in the statement’s description of Termination as
a disguised government effort “to annihilate the [country’s]
many Indians.”162 In explaining this stark change in tone, John
Trudell describes a realization among Indians that Termination
treated Indians more like “statistics” than people.163 According
to Trudell, this recognition lay not just in the fact that Indians
came to see themselves as “unemployed and disenfranchised,” as
they had “always been.”164 Rather, it resided in Native Americans’
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increasing capacity to recognize themselves as poor and becoming
increasingly poorer via Termination’s transfer of Indigenous land
and their resources out of Indian hands.165
At its inauguration in the late-1940s and early-1950s,
Senator Arthur Watkins, a Republican from Utah, hailed
Termination as “following in the footsteps [of ] the Emancipation
Proclamation.”166 Yet, for the Alcatraz occupiers and the American
Indians who experienced Termination’s effects, being forced
into mainstream society inspired attitudes that hardly mirrored
Watkins’ rhetoric. While Watkins supposedly saw Termination
embellishing the words “THESE PEOPLE SHALL BE FREE”
over the heads of American Indians, Native Americans largely came
to view the diminishing of their homelands as an introduction
to a “meat grinder…called [American] democracy.”167 Although
terminationists lauded HCR-108 as being in the best interests of
Native Americans, Indigenous newspapers’ description of such
legislation attests to it being anything but. By 1969, publications
such as the Akwesasne Notes were claiming it impossible to find an
Indian leader who had not rejected Termination, a policy which
wrested control of Indians’ sovereignty as if they were “children…
[unable to] think for themselves…decide for themselves…[or]
act for themselves.”168
By 1969, the perception that Indigenous people needed
to be assimilated into American society found itself passionately
rejected by IOAT. For almost two decades, Native Americans
denounced Termination under the premise that it deprived
Indians both of the raw materials needed to make socioeconomic gains and the few spaces where they could continue
living as distinct “tribal peoples.”169 Yet, as more and more Native
Americans found themselves driven from their homelands in
the 1950s and 60s, Indian rhetoric toward Termination turned
increasingly confrontational. While criticisms such as the 1960
NCAI letter first presented Termination as patronizing Indians’
ability to manage their resources, later 1960s activists such as
Adam Fortunate Eagle went so far as to denounce Termination
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as “the most insidious federal project of the twentieth century.”170
Fortunate Eagle and other IOAT members constituted a group of
Native Americans which, despite being coerced into abandoning
their communal homelands, came to view themselves as a
collective. The irony of these activists finding one another and
assuming the representation of all Indigenous peoples cannot be
understated given Termination’s explicit effort to notify Indians
that “‘some day they [are] going to reach the age of 21, and [will
have to] prepare themselves for [responsibility].”171 Of course,
IOAT activists more than shouldered the challenge of acting as
an all-inclusive voice for Native Americans, as they channeled
two decades of Indian aversion toward Termination into taking a
nationally recognized icon.
*****
As Termination exacerbated the destitute realities of
reservation life, American Indian frustration continued to
grow after the Employment Assistance Program’s (EAP) false
proclamation as the “final solution” to Indian poverty.172 As the
BIA’s urban relocation program, the EAP induced some 30,000
Native Americans to move to cities in the 1950s and almost
three times that number during the 1960s and 70s.173 Although
established with the stated intention of providing reservation
residents with vocational training and jobs, the EAP worked
more to dislocate and disintegrate Indigenous communities.174
“An undeniable force of transformation for Native peoples,”
urban relocation had the inadvertent effect of “confusing,
depersonalizing, and [ultimately angering]” an entire generation
of Indians, among whom included the Alcatraz occupation’s
architects.175 By the mid-1960s, however, this once nameless
generation of Native Americans had managed to transform
confusion into coalescence, emerging as an “increasingly
organized urban…population” intent on communicating Indian
experiences on reservations and in cities.176 For Al Miller, the
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impetus for this search and their culmination in Alcatraz’s takeover
were none other than Indians “wising up” to the logic behind
their resettlement: “The policy of the Bureau of Indian Affairs
to relocate Indians out of the reservation [and] assimilate them
into greater society backfired.”177 In the end, it was at Alcatraz,
according to Miller, that Indians unequivocally denounced
relocation and asserted that Indigenous welfare would continue
to decline so long as it remained outside the control of Indians
themselves.178
Even before Termination’s institution in 1953, the
federal government was formulating the EAP as encouragement
to Indian people to move away from their reservations.179 As a
kind of appendage to HCR-108, Congress devised a series of
vocational training initiatives based on the 1930s NavajoHopi work program as an alternative to the nearly non-existent
employment opportunities on Indigenous homelands.180 The
program’s final 1962 version provided Indians with a one-way bus
ticket to one of six relocation centers (Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas,
Denver, Los Angeles, or San Francisco), supplementary income
for household necessities, and job counseling for a year after
arrival.181 To encourage Native American participation, BIA field
offices distributed materials that sported the supposed luxuries
of city living.182 A collection of these advertisements spanning
from 1955 to 1975 depict well-dressed American Indian families
sitting in modern apartment living rooms and dining in kitchens
with the era’s latest electronic appliances.183 As if these images
were not appealing enough given the privation of reservation
life, the BIA often supplemented their marketing materials with
commentary highlighting a relocated family’s employer, local
schools, and church groups.184 In mocking these advertisements,
Fortunate Eagle describes BIA officials ecstatically proclaiming
to reservation Indians, “Come out and sign up for relocation,
we’re going to get you an apartment to live in, we’re going to
ship you free of charge, you and your family [and] grandma
and grandpa if [they] want to come along too!”185 The kind of
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cynicism represented by Fortunate Eagle’s ridicule soon became
commonplace in the lead-up to 1969, as relocated American
Indians encountered living conditions entirely different from
government-promised ones.
Although many Native Americans viewed relocation
as a “desperate last resort” to escape reservation poverty rather
than a choice “between various life alternatives,” few avoided a
sense of shock upon arriving in their new communities.186 Millie
Ketcheshawno, a Muskogee Creek Indian and one of the Alcatraz
occupation’s architects, recalls being astonished after reaching
Oakland on a BIA-sponsored bus: “[I] got off in a poverty-type area,
and said [to myself ], ‘oh my gosh this is just what I came from!’”187
Yet, Ketcheshawno’s surprise does not even begin to capture the
bewilderment that Indians experienced upon learning that the
government had little intention of providing the “retentionbased services” that it had promised.188 Initially assured monthly
stipends and the vocational training needed to obtain steady
work, relocated Native Americans often had any and all financial
assistance cut off after finding a job, which, for most, entailed
easily replaceable unskilled or semiskilled labor.189 The rat and
roach-infested housing that relocated Indians frequently found
themselves in only further contradicted the BIA’s glorification
of city living, as did the agency’s lack of a concerted effort to
resettle tribal members near one another.190 With limited survival
counseling in a non-Indian urban environment, including “how
to use a city map, call on a telephone, use a checking account, or
purchase goods at a supermarket,” relocatees found themselves
feeling “hemmed in in a thousand ways.”191
The sense of fear and trepidation that Native Americans
often experienced upon arriving in cities is given particular
expression in a 1969 article for the Native American newspaper
The Indian. This piece, which is also entitled “The Indian,”
describes a relocated Lakota Sioux family as “huddled together
in [an] apartment…unable to look beyond themselves to the
terrifying white world…because they don’t have the skills,
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cultural or technical, to cope with it.”192 “Left in an almost
inhuman situation,” urban Indians often turned to alcoholism
or to confiding in one another in trade schools, apartment
hallways, or “Indian bars,” to express their frustration and sense
of isolation.193 In the end, it was in finding other Indians that
relocated Native Americans recognized their anger, loneliness,
and, at times, consequent drunkenness as both a shared experience
and one exaggerating their socio-economic woes.
Finding one another was, however, a phenomenon that
evolved over a near two decades for urban Indians, and specifically
the occupiers themselves. No relocatee/occupier exemplifies
this better than Fortunate Eagle, whose success as a Bay Area
termite exterminator obscured his understanding of just how
“confused,” “lonely,” and desperate for cultural affinity, let alone
employment, that Indians were.194 In fact, it took Fortunate
Eagle almost ten years to awaken to the frustration facing other
relocatees and Indians in general when, participating in a series
of powwows in Golden State Park, he became fully immersed
in the Bay Area’s burgeoning Indian community.195 Throughout
the early and mid-1960s, the eventual occupier had taken his
family on trips to his former home, the Red Lake Reservation
(MN), in an effort to maintain some kind of connection to his
Chippewa heritage. Oftentimes, these trips led Fortunate Eagle
to question whether white Americans and Indians themselves
were more inclined to view Indigenous nations as “souvenirs”
from some bygone era than as people facing overwhelming
economic woes.196 This insecurity laid latent within the future
activist until his involvement in the powwows and a number
of Bay Area Indian organizations exposed him to a pervasive
sense of abandonment at the hands of the federal government
and the mindset that Indians, working together, could do more
for themselves than any government agency could.197 In other
words, a decade of listening to and discussing the economic and
cultural obstacles plaguing Indians from all over the country
encouraged Fortunate Eagle to look beyond what had once been
his personal quest for a “Cadillac [and] comfortable [Bay Area]
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house.”198 By 1969, the Chippewa Indian, who once wondered
whether Indians would be rendered “caricatures” of some distant
past, became convinced that a decade’s worth of communal and
political organizing in the Bay Area had made large-scale protest
only a phone call away.199
Early November 1969 proved Fortunate Eagle’s
inclination true when LaNada War Jack, then head of UCBerkeley’s Native Student Organization, received a phone call
from Oakes, who was serving as president of San Francisco
State University’s SCAN.200 Like Fortunate Eagle, it had taken
both War Jack and Oakes months and, in some cases, years after
relocating to grasp the extent to which all Indians were struggling
to survive financially and culturally. For War Jack, it was taking
up residence in a boarding house of some thirty Indian woman in
1965 that sparked her interest in “looking up” what was “going
on with Indians [at large] in the Bay Area.”201 By the time she
gained acceptance to UC-Berkeley in 1968, War Jack was deeply
disturbed by her finding that most Bay Area Indians, much like
herself, had been “dropped off” in San Francisco and left to
fend for themselves with hardly any support from the BIA.202
Oakes’s experience proved all too similar when, after moving
to San Francisco in 1968, he obtained work in the Bay Area’s
Mission District.203 During his aforementioned time bartending,
Oakes became immersed in Native American “politics of the
time, [be they concerning] relocation or termination, and [these
policies’ effects]” on Indians from across the country.204 The
former ironworker from upstate New York, who once grappled
with the realities of Termination on his own homeland, gathered
the stories of these other Indian relocatees and realized that his
anxieties extended well beyond himself.205 So when rumors of
a casino being built on Alcatraz surfaced in the fall of 1969,
Oakes did not hesitate to reach out to War Jack, who, through
the networks already established among San Francisco Indians at
Bay Area colleges, knew she would reciprocate his feelings. When
both agreed that a casino on Alcatraz meant “breaking a treaty
right…in [Indians’] faces,” a consensus about how to respond
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was immediately reached: “Enough talk. Let’s just do it.”206

Indian activists on Alcatraz on Thanksgiving Day, 1969

When the almost eighty Indian activists arrived on
Alcatraz on November 20, 1969, it became clear that they
had not only managed to find one another amidst relocation,
but that their frustration toward resettlement had far from
subsided. As if to encapsulate this, Stella Leach, a spokesman
for the occupation, answered the following when asked if the
takeover could solve the problems facing Bay Area Indians: “In
my mind it [i.e. the occupation] does, especially [regarding]
the isolation that we’ve been experiencing.”207 This notion of
relocation as “isolating” serves as just one grim conception, as
Vine Deloria Jr., former director of the NCAI, cites the EAP
as misguidedly assuming “that you could take an Indian family
into the city, give them employment training, help them find
a house, and [that] they would succeed, which is a definition
of a human being only in economic terms.”208 Fortunate Eagle
echoes Deloria’s condemnation of relocation as callous, claiming
that the federal government was essentially “through with” the
Alcatraz’s activists after they moved to the city, found some kind
of work, and received their first paycheck.209 These assertions are,
to say the least, far from unfounded, especially considering the
number of services promised to Indians and never made available
upon relocation.
Meanwhile, there are few instances that better illustrate
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American Indian animosity towards urban resettlement than a
December 1969 newscast, in which Richard Oakes, speaking
with representatives of the Office of Economic Opportunity
(OEO) and Department of Labor, describes many of the
Alcatraz occupiers as “dependent on the relocation program [for
survival].”210 When one of the visiting officials retorts that the
BIA has “other programs of use [for the relocatees],” a female
occupier passionately exclaims: “Once relocated…you are
not Indian anymore. They [i.e. the BIA] think you don’t have
[the] health problems that they [i.e. Native Americans] have
on the reservation. No one wants to deal with you. You just
keep getting referred back to the BIA.”211 War Jack echoes this
conviction that Indians were being left to fend for themselves
in environments equally if not more disadvantageous than
reservations, asserting that “all types of problems [experienced]
on relocation” left Alcatraz’s occupiers trapped at “the bottom” of
the socio-economic ladder.212 One especially alarming problem
that War Jack cites is Indians being left with only two choices
in urban slums: “kill yourself and get it over with…or try to go
all the way up [in terms of wealth and social status], [but] this
is almost impossible.”213 Together, these statements reflect both
an increasing level of weariness and disgruntlement among the
Alcatraz occupiers, whose movement aimed to end the isolation
facilitated by relocation.
At the conclusion of the Alcatraz takeover, the EAP
had overseen the resettlement of some 100,000 Native
Americans, but not without provoking an already aggravated
demographic.214 Activists such as Mankiller and Fortunate Eagle
are among those Indians who came to identify relocation, as well
as its predecessors, reservation confinement and Termination,
as “just one more policy in a long list of policies” aimed at
“destroying” American Indian livelihood.215 Assured by an end
to the economic destitution they had come to know intimately
well on reservations, relocated Native Americans were fortunate
if they received a fraction of the social services promised by the
BIA. These Indians, many of whom included Alcatraz’s future
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occupiers, often “jumped” to relocate, seeking some alternative
to their homelands’ non-existent employment opportunities.216
In the end, seclusion in “skid row” housing and a near
total lack of BIA aid, be it cultural or monetary, convinced
Alcatraz’s occupiers that relocation was but “another insidious
[means]” of depriving Indians of their lands and resources.217
Today, inadequate statistics concerning the number of Indians
who opted to return to their rural homes rather than remain
resettled inhibit a complete understanding of relocation’s
failures and the anger they produced.218 However, it remains
evident that the EAP frustrated and then consolidated a new
urban generation which would come to serve as the vanguard
of an emerging confrontational approach to Indian activism.219
Ramona Bennett, a Puyallup Indian, relocatee, and participant
in the Nisqually fish-ins, affirmed relocation as a “planned”
federal effort to “alienate Indians and [their] land” during a
1970 visit to Alcatraz.220 Ironically, the alienation of Indians, first
on reservations and then in cities, resulted in a unification of
Indigenous activists who sought an end to the socio-economic
destitution that had come to characterize their lives.
Motivations Part II: Dying “Indianness”
“Wake up Injun! Wake up!” serves as the introduction
to Yvonne Chapela’s 1968 article “Red Awareness.”221 Published
in the Native American newspaper The Warpath, the succeeding
lines of Chapela’s work criticize twentieth century Indigenous
peoples for abandoning their “Indian culture” to gain acceptance
in a “white man’s” world:
YOU, learning German when you don’t even know
Navajo or Sioux or Chippewa!
YOU, thinking you’re a success when you marry a whitey!
YOU, putting on a tweed suit when attending a pow90
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pow with mostly all whites dancing!
YOU, taking a whitey on a tour of your reservation. Look
what happened when you first toured the pilgrims!
Wake up Injun! Wake up!
YOU, celebrating Thanksgiving!
YOU, saying “Oh I have a drop of Indian blood in me,
but I’m mostly French!”
YOU, cutting and bleaching your hair to hide what you
are!
YOU, kissing the white man’s ass!
Wake up Injun! Wake up!
YOU, thinking the BIA is really helping you!
YOU, believing all that shit written about Indians in
history books!
Wake up Injun! Wake up!
WAKE UP! RISE! SCREAM! YELL! JUMP! ACT!!
BECOME AWARE!!!!!!!!...Before you turn around and
never hear the word “Indian” again.222
The article’s final line, that of “never [hearing] the word ‘Indian’
again,” may first appear as an exaggeration, especially given
how American Indians numbered 764,000 at the time of the
piece’s publication.223 Yet, the notion that Indians were, in fact,
abandoning their Indigenous heritage to “make it” in mainstream
American society was as pressing a concern for 1960s Indigenous
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activists as the socio-economic status of Native Americans.224 By
1969, the fear that Indigenous heritage would be extinguished
amidst a larger and ill-disposed white American society had
reached its pinnacle. In taking Alcatraz, IOAT asserted that, if
Indigenous peoples were to salvage their remaining traditions
and ways of life, they needed to break with a white culture that
had been expecting them to sacrifice their own for “over four
hundred years.”225 Inspired in large part by the Black Panther
Party, this mindset translated into an administration of Alcatraz
that prioritized the flourishing of Indigenous lifeways while
dismissing white ones.226 Evidence for this reality remains
especially visible in IOAT’s all-Indian education program, its
encouragement of other Native American activist movements,
and its banning of white Americans from the island.
During Alcatraz’s November 10 takeover, one of the
fourteen Native American students present described the former
prison as nothing but a monument to a “sick society.”227 This
remark, coupled with a succeeding statement that the activists
“we’re going to change [Alcatraz] into…a good society…A society
for Indians” may be seen as foreshadowing IOAT’s administration
of the Rock.228 For the occupation’s instigators, a “society for
Indians” represented not only widespread Indian rejection
of, but a solution to, the federal government’s persecution of
Indigenous people. Yet, the notion that Native Americans needed
to collectively wrest control of the forces shaping their welfare
and dictating their sense of Indianness was not one that IOAT
independently devised.229 Rather, the urgency, theatricality, and
unapologetic condemnation of white society with which IOAT
carried out its occupation was very much an adaptation of “Black
Power” tactics.230 At a time when War Jack, Fortunate Eagle, and
Oakes were still searching for a solution to the plight of Native
Americans, Black Power, as embodied by the Black Panther Party
for Self-Defense, was taking the Bay Area by storm and providing
a valuable model for the Rock’s future occupiers.
“Am I under arrest? Am I under arrest? Take your hands
off me if I’m not under arrest!” were the shouts of an impassioned
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Black Panther Party member being escorted out of the California
state capitol building on May 2, 1967.231 This activist, along with
twenty-nine other black men and women, had come to the state
assembly to protest a recent gun-control bill aimed at denying
Black Panthers the right to arm themselves while following police
cars.232 In a fashion that would be almost exactly replicated by
IOAT, these activists read a statement condemning the bill on
the steps of the Capitol Building, and then marched into the
legislative chambers’ visitors’ gallery toting the very weapons that
the assembly was debating taking away.233 The demonstration’s
main instigator, Huey P. Newton, had planned these events with
the utmost attention to detail, taking every precaution in the
weeks prior to ensure their legality.234 Perhaps not surprisingly,
the protest still resulted in the arrest of the activists present,
but not before achieving its desired end: nearly every police
officer, reporter, and TV cameramen in the area flocked to the
disturbance.235 Despite the efforts of the California Legislature,
Newton and Bobby G. Seale, cofounder of the Black Panther
Party, not only succeeded in making their frustrations heard,
but further advanced the public’s knowledge of their cause. The
Black Panthers, like the IOAT activists who would follow in their
footsteps, had no intention of abandoning the spotlight until the
struggles of black Americans received the attention they were
due.
By the time the Alcatraz occupiers were familiarizing
themselves with the logistics of public disobedience on college
campuses, the Black Panther Party (BPP) had become the
talk of the Bay Area.236 Founded in October 1966 by Newton
and Seale, the BPP was initially formed in response to police
brutality against black civilians, but quickly became an outlet for
black Americans disgruntled with the Civil Rights Movement’s
emphasis on nonviolent protest.237 Under Newton and Seale,
the party published a ten-point platform entitled “What We
Want, What We Believe,” the dark irony of which would later be
matched by IOAT’s “Proclamation to the Great White Father.”238
Issuing demands ranging from employment to “decent housing,
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fit for the shelter of human beings” to the exemption of black men
from military service, the BPP sought everything by way of the
federal government’s long “overdue debt of forty acres and two
mules.”239 Yet, perhaps the party’s most unbending demand was
that African Americans serve as the architects of social reform, a
condition the Panthers claimed as having been repeatedly denied
to generations of blacks under racist pretenses.240 For the BPP,
the current civil rights movement was moving at too slow a
rate and utilizing too passive a stance to halt the economic and
cultural assault being launched against black Americans.241 This
perception, coupled with the belief that the federal government
was adopting civil rights rhetoric but not putting it into practice,
translated into the BPP enacting its own reforms.242 The party’s
police patrols became arguably its most notable, but the Panthers’
overarching conviction that only black people could redefine
their status in American society proved an influential precedent
for Indigenous activists to come.243
When War Jack and Oakes encountered the potential
of large-scale protest, Black Power had become so prominent in
the Bay Area that other social movements had begun defining
themselves in relation to it.244 Upon War Jack’s establishment
of the Native Student Organization at UC-Berkeley, her and
other activists’ adoption of “Red Power” as a kind of calling for
Indigenous reform was something she attributed to the example
set by the BPP: “We didn’t really [come up with the name] ‘Red
Power.’ That was just something already on campus because
there was ‘Black Power’…[confrontational Indian activism] was
difficult for some [Indigenous] people [to understand] because
[we were still trying] to reestablish [a] link to our cultural
identity.”245 Of course, for War Jack and the other instigators of
the Alcatraz takeover, the concept of a shared struggle to maintain
Indianness was much easier to grasp having “drunk deeply from
the well” of protest present on college campuses.246 The Panthers’
presentation of themselves as “never making an unprovoked
attack but defending ferociously whenever attacked” struck a
profound chord with student activists, especially “New Leftist”
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ones participating in the Third World Liberation Front at UCBerkeley and San Francisco State University.247 This organization,
which recruited both Oakes and War Jack, viewed the absence
of ethnic studies departments as an affront to “the rights of all
oppressed peoples,” and launched strikes so extensive in 196869 that they drew the response of Governor Ronald Reagan
and the California National Guard.248 Influenced by a party
that demanded social reform immediately rather than at some
indeterminate point in time, the Third World Liberation protests
caught the attention of disgruntled young Indians such as Oakes
and War Jack, while teaching them “all the [protest] tactics” they
needed to know.249

Painted on a wall at Alcatraz, 1970

By November 1969, Oakes, War, Jack, and other Indian
activists who once internally wrestled with the struggle to
maintain their cultural identity had become seasoned observers
of demonstrations taking place on college campuses or in Bay
Area streets. The Black Panther Party had, in the later half of
the 1960s, broken with the existing Civil Rights Movement
in advocating a more assertive approach to social reform, one
that soon worked its way onto the campuses of future IOAT
members.250 If Bay Area Indians did not observe the BPP’s
influence on events such as Third World Liberation strikes, they
heard the party condemn the federal government for promising
blacks socio-economic advancement without establishing any
kind of set time frame. They also witnessed the Panthers’ calls
for young African Americans “to take a look at themselves,” and
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realize that white Americans had, and always would, allow for the
subjugation of blacks so long as it was economically profitable.251
For Panthers such as Stokely Carmichael and Charles V.
Hamilton, a nonviolent approach to civil rights, which had since
characterized black activism, represented an approach that “black
people [could not] afford and a luxury that white people [did
not] deserve.”252
While alarming to mainstream America, the Black
Panthers’ blatant disregard for the existing social structure and
the insistence that a persecuted people collectively take hold of
their identity could not have been more relatable for the architects
of the Alcatraz takeover. In a manner closely resembling the
Panthers, occupier Lehman Brightman recalls: “I saw what the
[BIA] was doing to [Indian] peoples. [It] was screwing them
around…I saw all the goddamn problems that Indians had in
urban areas…and I wanted to do something badly [but] there
was no way [at first]…[So] we [started protesting] for one specific
reason: just raise goddamn hell! And we raised a hell of a lot of
hell!”253 The “hell” which Brightman references found ultimate
expression in Alcatraz’s 1969 occupation, albeit retaining much
of the boldness, confidence, and demonstrativeness that the Black
Panthers had exhibited just two years earlier in the California
State Assembly. In fact, the confidence with which Oakes dictated
the “Proclamation to the Great White Father” on November 10,
1969, may be seen as almost exactly mirroring Newton’s reciting
the California Penal Code to encroaching swarms of Sacramento
law enforcement and reporters.254 In the years that separated
the two demonstrations, Oakes and other IOAT activists awoke
to needing to “rise,” “scream,” “yell” in defense of Indigenous
culture.255 Their awakening was, however, due in large part to
observing another group of activists possessing the audacity to
proclaim to black Americans that “[white men] would whisper a
prayer, give [their] wives a pill, deny [their] daughters medication,
put [their] sons on the front lines, and piously blow [their] brains
out.”256 Shown a model of protest that demanded immediate
reform while criticizing larger American society, IOAT launched
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its 1969 occupation as a signal to Native Americans that it was
now time to “close ranks” between their culture and that of white
Americans.257
*****
After observing and adopting many of the BPP’s
attitudes, the Alcatraz occupiers insisted upon the creation
of an all-Indian educational complex, one that would serve to
distance Indigenous culture from the “polluting” effects of white
influence.258 During a conference between Alcatraz’s spokesmen,
the OEO and Department of Labor, Stella Leach commented
that improvements in Indian education were foremost among
the reforms that the occupiers hoped to achieve.259 The Indian
education system’s failure to train Native Americans “to return to
their [reservations] and be of some use to them” proved especially
problematic to IOAT, and resulted in the group’s demand that a
cultural complex run and staffed by Indians be constructed on
the island.260 This institution, in addition to teaching Indigenous
peoples the technical skills needed to improve their reservations,
was to educate Indians of all ages concerning their oppression
“at the hands of white [men].”261 The present situation of Indian
education was, according to the occupiers, “indoctrinating”
Native Americans with BIA-sponsored “propaganda” aimed at
concealing centuries of subjugation by “Uncle Sam.”262 Echoing
Oakes’s comment that a “dual sense of justice” existed towards
American Indians, Alcatraz’s occupiers asserted that, if Indians
were not awarded control over their education, their economic
destitution and suppression by the federal government would
only continue to constitute “sad facets of history.”263
While Indians’ dissatisfaction with their education reached
a climax in 1969, disgruntlement towards federal administration
of Indigenous schools has its origins in the beginning of the
twentieth century. It was during this period that the federal
government sanctioned the forced removal of Native American
children from their families to be educated in white boarding
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schools.264 Although the stated intention of this action was to
“guide [Indians] in the proper way of living,” later Native American
generations and activists such as Mankiller and Fortunate Eagle
came to view the boarding school policy as possessing the same
aims as Termination and relocation: the destruction of Indigenous
people’s culture or sense of “Indianness.”265 Approximately fifty
to sixty years after the decline of Indian boarding schools, the
conviction that an Indian educational system overseen by the
U.S. government would continue to cause Indians to forsake
their culture remained prevalent.266 In an article published just
months before Alcatraz’s occupation, The Warpath declared the
BIA, the agency entrusted with administering Indian schools, as
woefully incapable of understanding “Indian failures and wasted
lives.”267 Citing the bureau’s employment of 22,000 employees,
over half of which were non-Indians, and staffing of ninety-five
percent of its top executive positions with white Americans, the
article denounced the BIA as not only ignorant of the problems
endemic to Indigenous communities, but wrongfully claiming
the authority to address them.268
Meanwhile, another article published by The Warpath
awards further credence to the claim that federal oversight
of Indian education was figuratively, and sometimes literally,
killing an Indian’s sense of him or herself. This piece, which
details the journey of the president of an Indian parent-teachers
organization to an Indigenous junior high school in Ponca,
Oklahoma, is nothing short of alarming.269 Over the course of
one day, Mrs. Martha Grass observes both the school’s passing
of children who are unable to read to the fourth and fifth grades
and permitting seventh and eighth grade students to “sniff glue
and paint [in class].”270 The sight of Indian children with their
“eyelids puffed closed” and “lips hanging” ultimately leaves Mrs.
Grass pleading for “something…to be done about our [Native
American] children…[They] need help!”271 With these realities
familiar to the occupiers themselves, IOAT both rejected a BIAcontrolled Indian education system and demanded “insulation”
from a white society out-of-touch with Indigenous struggles and
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complacent in letting them persist.272
Convinced that American Indian culture was bound
to expire under BIA oversight, Alcatraz’s occupiers sought
the development of a complex that would teach everything
from engineering to Indigenous medicine to tribal dances and
songs.273 The overarching purpose of this complex was to produce
generations of Native Americans who, unlike their predecessors,
would maintain their American Indian identity while recognizing
the federal government’s continual “manipulation” of Indigenous
peoples.274 In order to encourage Indians to maintain their
“Indianess,” Alcatraz’s educational complex sought the
flourishing of tribal lifeways by teaching subjects that ranged
from Indigenous “arts and crafts” to “religious and sacred healing
ceremonies” to traditional “music [and] dance.”275 The impulse
for doing so stemmed from the perception that the BIA had long
educated Indians without any acknowledgement of their cultural
past, a practice more inclined toward “teaching Indian youth to
be ashamed of [their Indianness],” rather than proud of it.276
In a 1970 statement, IOAT extended its critique of the
BIA’s education curriculum to the American university system,
which, although including a small but gradually increasing
number of Native Americans, offered hardly any courses
concerning Indigenous history or culture.277 The sense that the
isolation present on reservations and in urban areas was following
Indian students to college campuses fueled the conception of
the complex and its incorporation of an all-Indian vocational
school.278 The stated intention behind the school’s founding
was that of enabling Native Americans to return to their
reservations and address their lack of industrial development.279
While recognizing the need for Native Americans to “equip
themselves with the weapons” needed to survive financially,
IOAT discouraged full immersion in a culture believed to be a
“façade which Indians [should learn to] hate.”280 Rather, IOAT
saw “standing outside the American mainstream” as something to
be valued, precisely because it entailed the maintenance of one’s
own Indian lifeways instead of assuming “shallow white ones”
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that included an obsession with wealth and willingness to wage
war.281 The continuation of skills such as traditional Indian dance,
language, crafts, and medicine all constituted a larger effort to
encourage Native Americans to see themselves not as a “pitiful”
demographic, but as descendants of “once great peoples” whose
“nobility” and “sovereignty” should and could be resurrected.282
In addition to restoring a sense of honor in claiming
Native American heritage, Alcatraz’s educational complex sought
to inform its students of the perils of dealing with an indifferent
and, at times, hostile federal government. Vital to this effort was
the complex’s inclusion of an American Indian Museum, which,
according to Oakes’s November 20 Proclamation, would feature
Native American “cultural contributions to the world” as well as
“some of the things white men [had] first given to…Indians”:
“disease, alcohol, poverty, and cultural decimation.”283 With the
museum focusing on the earliest encounters between Indigenous
peoples and white Europeans, the remainder of the complex
intended to teach facets of American Indian history “concealed”
by BIA curriculum.284
Foremost among the “sad historical facets” to be displayed
by IOAT’s museum was the U.S. government’s longstanding
use of “divide and conquer techniques.”285 Be they in the form
of reservations, Termination, or relocation, these policies were
to be denounced as keeping Indians physically separated from
one another and incapable of unifying in opposition of federal
policies.286 Having revealed these techniques as geared towards
outright American Indian “genocide,” Alcatraz’s cultural complex
would educate its students concerning the many hardships
endured by Native Americans, hardships that, although “censored”
by the BIA, included “surrendering an entire continent” and
making treaties in return for “basic services like health care”
that were never received.287 Decades of overlooking the federal
government’s mistreatment of Indigenous peoples were, in the
occupiers’ opinions, over, and it was the explicit intention of the
Rock’s complex to see this change in Indian education through.
Furthermore, Alcatraz’s cultural complex sought to ensure
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that American Indian youth would reject the lure of “middle-class
white status,” as was the supposed intention of “white oriented
university machinery,” in exchange for becoming counselors
and elders within their own Indigenous communities.288 It was
within these leadership positions that graduates of the complex
could maneuver disputes between the federal government and
their peoples, conflicts that, encompassing everything from land
ownership rights to those of religious practice, could determine
whether Indigenous lifeways would subsist or be eradicated.289
Of course, these struggles, as described by Harvey Wells, could
never be won unless Native Americans were first instilled with
the the sense that they, rather than the “non-Indians running the
BIA,” could govern their own futures.290 Therefore, the ultimate
“mission” of Alcatraz’s educational complex was not only to
encourage a sense of pride in being Native American, but also
to reveal that such pride had long been under siege by a white
society intent on “cramming” its own lifeways “down [Indians’]
throats.”291 From IOAT’s perspective, white American influence
had spent decades, and in many respects, centuries, eroding
Indians’ conviction that they themselves could affect change in
their lives and communities. The decision to occupy Alcatraz and
establish a cultural complex represented a long latent desire to
reverse this trend, ultimately presenting itself when the dismal
state of Indian education became too much to bear.
*****
While the development of an all-Indian educational
complex reflected a desire to salvage Indigenous culture,
Alcatraz’s occupiers’ public support for other Native American
resistance movements also illustrates a passion for the survival of
Indian culture over white society’s caustic influence. In a 1970
“manifesto” published by IOAT, Alcatraz’s occupiers declared
that “All Indian problems, whether of an individual or tribe, must
be shared by all. To separate now at this great potential time of
unity, is to become extinct.”292 Convinced that most Indigenous
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movements devoted themselves to Indian unity only to “fade,
die, or become entangled in bureaucratic manipulations,” IOAT
viewed its motivations as not only resembling, but directly
paralleling those driving other contemporary American Indian
protests.293
The glaring difference between Alcatraz and other
unfolding Indigenous movements was, however, a lack of media
attention, an element which the Rock’s holders sought to provide.
Irene Silentman is one activist who references this intention,
positing in February 1970 that “[Alcatraz], if handled right,
[could] bring the problems of Indians to the attention of the
average American…If the average American picks up a newspaper
and reads about Pyramid Lake…it doesn’t concern [him/her]…
but Alcatraz…that concerns everybody.”294 “Pyramid Lake” was
among a number of Native American protests occurring at the
time of Alcatraz’s holding, and its success according to IOAT
constituted a larger struggle over whether “Indians would once
more be responsible for their destinies.”295 Clyde Bellecourt,
an Ojibwe Indian and co-founder of the American Indian
Movement (AIM), was just one activist who affirms this mindset,
describing Alcatraz’s “legacies” as “many” but believing that its
encouragement of the “long, [shared] Indian fight” emerged
foremost among them.296
Imbued with the sense that the federal government
had long kept Indians and their struggle to maintain their
identity divided, IOAT made its unequivocal support for other
Indigenous movements of its era known through publicizing
protests at Pyramid Lake, Round Valley, and Washington State.
Through its Indians of All Tribes newsletter, radio broadcasts,
and interviews with local and national media, IOAT not only
aimed to highlight the injustices being levied against Indians at
these sites, but also to encourage its Native American audience to
join the movements themselves. Evidence for this is first seen in
IOAT’s coverage of the resistance movement then taking place at
Pyramid Lake (NV), and its encouragement of Native American
activists to align themselves against a common adversary: “never
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satisfied and greedy” white farmers and ranchers.297
By 1970, Pyramid Lake, which refers both to the
reservation that houses the Paiute Tribe and the thirty by eight
mile lake which has served as the tribe’s sacred fishing territory,
was drying up thirty to fifty inches a year due to its being diverted
away from the reservation.298 Specifically, the state was using the
lake’s water to nourish the cattle of the aforementioned farmers
and ranchers as well as create ponds for white duck hunters “to
play in.”299 With the Paiutes protesting the diminishment of their
sacred lake, Alcatraz’s occupiers’ saw one of the “first opportunities”
to carry out the “dream” embodied by their cultural complex.300
Through the second and third publications of its newsletter,
IOAT organized and then related the experiences of a caravan of
forty Native American activists to Pyramid Lake, describing their
journey as “furthering the cause of Indian unity” against “a blind
government” and preserving “the magic” that takes place when
Paiutes are able to “roam their ancient shorelines.”301 Equally as
prominent in these publications is the caravan’s description of
Sparks, Nevada, a casino town passed on their trip, as a white
man’s “spell,” characterized by “flashing neon and pink-eyed slot
machines…plastic entertainment…visions of fortune won and
re-won in nightmare nirvana…[and] sad greeds that blow the
mind to hate.”302 Unrelenting in its criticisms of the “white men”
responsible for Pyramid Lake’s depletion, IOAT’s administering
Alcatraz in a manner aimed to preserve Indian sovereignty is on
full display in its covering the Paiute protests.
Just as IOAT undertook efforts to circulate the events
at Pyramid Lake, the group’s publicizing of the Indigenous
resistance movement unfolding at the Round Valley Reservation
(CA) is another instance of its wanting to protect Native
American culture from the federal government’s unwelcome
presence. While the protests at Round Valley may have been
reaching a climax in the midst of the Alcatraz occupation, IOAT
and the various tribes housed on the reservation declared the
struggle rooted in an “old [U.S. government] trick.”303 Although
the Army Corp of Engineers assured that the construction of the
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Dos Rios Dam over Round Valley would leave the Indians there
“better off than before,” the reservation’s inhabitants viewed the
federal government as employing the same deceitfulness used to
manipulate the Seneca Indians into surrendering their reservation
land just a decade prior.304
When the Round Valley Indians publicly questioned
the Army Corps’ assertion that their reservation needed to be
flooded to supply Southern Californians with water, IOAT’s
newsletters denounced the Dos Rios Dam as the conception
of “white barons” aiming to grow federally subsidized groups,
add to the food surplus, and grow richer.305 Although promised
that the dam’s building would facilitate tourism in the southern
half of the state, the profits of which would supposedly be
extended to the Indians themselves, the Round Valley residents
dismissed guarantees of wealth from resorts and tourist sites as
empty as those once made to the Seneca tribe.306 Echoing these
claims in its third newsletter publication, IOAT emboldened
the Round Valley Indians’ objection to the dam by declaring it
a “conspiracy” orchestrated by the Army Corp and the “good
old” BIA.307 Adamant that if attention and action were not soon
drawn to the conflict, IOAT asserted that “water would flow”
over the Round Valley Reservation and that “grass would grow
over the bones” of its inhabitants, just as the flooding of the
Seneca Reservation had erased the land’s sacred Cornplanter
burial grounds.308 Concluding that the fight of the Round Valley
Indians was the same fight that Native Americans had always
been waging against a government more loyal to profits than
honoring Indigenous lifeways, IOAT warned that it would soon
be too late to salvage the Round Valley Indians and tribes faced
with similar predicaments.309
In a manner mirroring its broadcasting of the Round Valley
protests, IOAT undertook significant efforts to present the Native
American resistance movements taking place in Washington
State as longstanding fights against forced assimilation into
white society. As mentioned earlier, Native American protests in
Washington State had been inaugurated decades before Alcatraz’s
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takeover by activists such as Billy Frank and Bob Satiacum.310
By 1969, Native American fishing rights, particularly as they
pertained to the Nisqually, Puyallup, and Muckleshoot tribes,
had emerged at the forefront of Indigenous resistance movements
in the state.311 Due in large part to the efforts of Hank Adams,
a Sioux-Assiniboine activist, the aforementioned tribes began
participating in “fish-ins” in 1963 to protest their barring from
traditional fishing grounds being used to accommodate white
sportsmen and fisheries.312 With their protests well underway
by 1969 but struggling to garner attention outside the Pacific
Northwest, IOAT publicized the Washington Indians’ struggle
and welcomed Al Bridges, a Nisqually “fish-in” organizer, to sell
“freedom fish” at San Francisco’s Pier 40.313 After meeting Bridges
and traveling to confer with Adams in Washington, the Alcatraz
Indians of All Tribes editorial staff praised the Pacific Northwest
activists for refusing to surrender their “Indian way of life…to
be…assimilated into white society,” and encouraged readers to
make donations to the fish-ins.314
In addition to praising Indigenous activists such as
Adams, IOAT also promoted the traveling of other Indians to
partake in the Washington protests. In March 1970, IOAT’s
newsletter denounced the arrest of 77 activists who, mirroring
the Alcatraz occupiers, invaded the U.S. military’s Fort Lawton
under the title “United Indians of All Tribes” (UIAT).315 Hailing
the invasion as a necessary step towards maintaining Indians’
“basic livelihood and survival,” IOAT expressed no remorse for
opposing the “greedy, white-controlled fisheries” considered to
be the cause of the controversy.316 In a resounding testament
to its conviction that the continuation of Native American
culture was under assault by white society, IOAT concluded its
coverage of the Washington State protests with the statement:
“We must once more live in dignity and take the responsibilities
of our own destinies…THERE WILL BE NO MORE
COMPROMISES!”317 Alcatraz’s occupiers, in effect, viewed
compromise as contributing to the federal onslaught against
Indian property and the Indigenous heritage tied intimately to it.
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Centuries of cooperation with impersonal and white-controlled
institutions had, in IOAT’s opinion, created a crisis concerning
Indians’ sovereignty over their education, homelands, and distinct
identity as Native Americans. For Alcatraz’s occupiers, a crisis
of this magnitude had long warranted drastic action, not only
through one Indigenous demonstration but the sustainment of
countless others.
*****
Although less advertised than IOAT’s proposed all-Indian
educational complex and encouragement of other Indigenous
movements, the Alcatraz occupiers’ banning of white Americans
and, at times, white cultural norms is another reflection of the
toxicity they attributed to mainstream American society. IOAT’s
forbidding white Americans seems to have been both ideological
and practical, especially considering the nineteen-month
stalemate between the occupiers and the U.S. Coast Guard.318
By 1970, the Coast Guard in collaboration with the GSA had
cut off all utilities to the island and placed a barricade around it,
thereby inducing numerous confrontations between patrolmen
and Indigenous activists attempting to breach the barrier via
speedboat.319 Although federal authorities were under orders to
refrain from removing the occupiers altogether, IOAT remained
convinced that the Coast Guard and GSA were waiting for some
kind of “slip up” that would warrant the activists’ arrest.320 John
Trudell captures this conviction best in a June 1970 interview,
when, after being questioned over whether authorities would
find reason to remove Alcatraz’s occupiers, replied, “The
[federal government] has been stopping Indians’ [protests] on
technicalities for a hundred years. Why should they change
now?”321 The fear that the passage of whites, be they Indigenous
sympathizers or ordinary civilians, to and from the island could
serve as one factor among many justifying the occupation’s end
undoubtedly fostered IOAT’s belief that insularity amongst
the resistance group was integral to its cause. However, there
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was also an unmistakable sociopolitical component to the
ban, as Alcatraz’s occupiers viewed the survival of Indigenous
culture as requiring literal separation from the white society
and bureaucracy encroaching on it. Instilled with the belief
that mainstream society had and always would treat Native
Americans “differently” and “separately,” IOAT concluded that
its movement and the flourishing of Indian lifeways naturally
required “remaining separately.”322
Within just days of their November 20 takeover,
Alcatraz’s occupiers manifested their mistrust towards white
culture and conviction that it was eroding Indigenous identity at
a Thanksgiving celebration. This festival was funded entirely by
donors, many of whom were white, and characterized by peace
pipe smoking, rock music, and a fall-oriented feast, all considered
shared Indian practices, be they past or present.323 Publicized by
IOAT as open to Indians across the country, the festival proved
to be as antagonistic towards white society as encouraging
towards Indian unity.324 On the eve of the occupiers’ second
Thanksgiving in 1970, LaNada War Jack declared that IOAT’s
previous celebration and its upcoming one sought to reclaim
an aspect of Native American history that had been perverted
by mainstream American society.325 Asserting that Indians had
practiced fall harvests for hundreds of years, War Jack denounced
the so-called “first Thanksgiving” between whites and Native
Americans as the result of “white people starving” after arriving
in America, and celebrating with Indians only because they
“had to.”326 In an effort to no longer let white Americans “live
a lie,” War Jack rebuked any donations made under the pretense
that they would be preserving some long-standing goodwill
between Indians and whites.327 This remark, as well as War Jack’s
affirmation that whites would again be barred from the festival,
reveal both an effort to reclaim a well-established Indian custom
while distancing Indian lifeways from the distorting influence of
white society.
In addition to IOAT’s banning white participation in the
occupiers’ Thanksgiving celebrations, the group’s insistence that
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white Americans be barred from the island altogether is another
reflection of its desire to divorce itself from mainstream American
culture. In a February 1970 interview, Stella Leach insisted that
the occupiers had “one very simple rule” regarding outsiders: the
only non-Indians allowed to visit Alcatraz would be the press
and doctors and lawyers representing the activists themselves.328
With doctors and lawyers administering much needed medical
care and legal advice in the midst of a government barricade,
the permitting of news reporters was meant to keep national
attention on the occupiers’ cause.329 Media access to the island
flooded news broadcasts with images of an Indian-controlled
Alcatraz that, in its year and a half duration, sported signs and
graffitied buildings with one particularly unmistakable message:
“Indian Land: Keep Out!”330
Keeping white Americans off Alcatraz proved to be a
position that the occupiers meant quite literally, as in March
1971, John Trudell revealed to Bay Area media that IOAT was
growing frustrated with tour boats circling the island trying to
catch a glimpse of the unfolding “Indian spectacle.”331 Teeming
with white passengers, Trudell crossly denounced these Bay Area
boat rides as treating the occupiers like curiosities in a “zoo.”332 For
IOAT, the “sightseeing” denounced by Trudell only strengthened
a laden conviction that white society and the institutions it
entrusted with managing Indian affairs were simply incapable of
understanding the plight of Native Americans and thus the aims
of the occupation. Although the intentions of Alcatraz’s holding
were deeply personal to IOAT and other non-participating
Indians, the sense that white Americans viewed the movement as
“fun” or “entertainment” confirmed perceptions that Indigenous
peoples would never escape a labeling that, at best, deemed
them “symbols” of some great but bygone American era.333 Such
depreciation toward IOAT’s cause not only overlooked the fact
that the occupiers’ were, at least at the outset of their movement,
well-organized, but offered resounding affirmation that Native
American lifeways were bound to dwindle in a society unwilling
to respect them.
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Less than three weeks after Alcatraz’s November 20 taking,
Kim Robertson, San Francisco’s regional GSA representative,
led an aforementioned party of OEO and Department of
Labor representatives onto the island to “visualize the problems
underlying [the occupation].”334 Smoking a pipe and strolling at
the head of the group, Robertson answered reporters in a manner
so vague that many of the media personnel present struggled to
figure out who he or the organization he represented was. “I am
the current regional council [of ] this group [that] you see here of
the essentially organized federal agency that has resources available
for employment, training, housing, education, health, and similar
matters” was among Robertson’s first statements to reporters, an
announcement so unclear that one of the journalists interrupted
him with the remark, “So you’re the regional council of what
exactly?”335 As if this declaration was not ambiguous enough,
Robertson followed his introduction by declaring that he might
be able to respond to the occupiers’ demands, “assuming they
[were] viable concepts,” “through various national headquarters
[in the form] of a coordinated response.”336 Clearly content with
his answers, Robertson, with his fellow representatives on his
heels, proceeded to make his way toward the building where the
meeting would be held, inspiring another journalist to exclaim,
“Wait, what did that guy even say his name was?”337
Although it is ungrounded to presume that Robertson
had little intention of addressing the occupiers’ grievances, the
unimpressed looks and responses that he proceeded to draw from
Oakes and other IOAT representatives at their December 10
meeting suggest that the occupiers saw him as the embodiment
of the very thing that they were protesting: an indifferent,
uninformed, and impersonal federal bureaucracy.338 It was this
bureaucracy, controlled by white Americans as ignorant as those
who tried to catch a glimpse of Indian-controlled Alcatraz on tour
boats, that the Rock’s occupiers’ viewed as having “sat around”
with Indians for centuries, talking about reforms for Indigenous
peoples but “getting nothing done.”339 A reflection of a society
that cared little for Indian lifeways and, at times, encouraged
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their eradication, the federal government and its administration
of Native American welfare were nothing short of a “national
disgrace” for Alcatraz’s occupiers.340
Therefore, be it in Uncle Sam’s oversight of Indian
education or suppression of Indigenous resistance movements,
Indian culture, was, in IOAT’s eyes, dying, and needed to be
salvaged before it was completely forgotten. In a refusal to “just
sit back” and watch their culture vanish, the Alcatraz occupiers
sought the founding of an all-Indian educational complex,
encouraged other Indigenous protests, and unapologetically
restricted white Americans from visiting the island.341 Declaring
in the second publication of its newsletter that non-Indian society
had long “cloaked the Indian in complete darkness,” IOAT
proclaimed that its actions had removed the “shroud” that once
surrounded Native Americans.342 Now, according to the Alcatraz
occupiers, Indians were “shouting their grievances to the world,”
and they would be heard whether Americans wanted to listen or
not.343
Conclusion
On June 11, 1971, Alcatraz’s remaining fifteen occupiers
found themselves apprehended by over thirty U.S. marshals,
brought back to the California mainland, and herded onto a
school bus headed for a San Francisco law office.344 Upon arriving
at the office, a teenage activist’s exclamation “power to the Indian
people!” drew the attention of one of the marshals, who, although
his response is not entirely audible, seems to have instructed the
young protestor to “calm down.”345 The activist’s reply all but
encapsulates the attitude that the Alcatraz occupiers exhibited
towards federal authority: “Shut the hell up!”346 Perhaps a fitting
last remark for a movement that, for nineteen months, rejected
almost all of “what [white] civilization [had to] offer,” Alcatraz’s
1969 takeover deserves recognition as the culmination of decades
of Native American discontent.347 Occupier Harvey Wells’
aforementioned remark that the Alcatraz occupiers belonged
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to a generation of Indians who, rather than conceiving the idea
of resistance, adopted it from their predecessors and put it into
practice could not be more accurate.348 As described by activist
George Horse Capture, Alcatraz’s occupation was far from some
spontaneous protest spurred by the disgruntlements of a handful
of college students. Rather, Alcatraz was an event which came to
fruition when Indians, “instead of passively withdrawing” from
an era of national upheaval, “stepped forward…and [made it]
known that they were…proud, and [that] their present situation
must and would change.”349 The Alcatraz occupiers, in other
words, arrived on the island on November 10, 1969, with an
“idea,” a concept whose aims of shedding light on years of
American Indian suppression were goals that the Rock’s holders
had every intention of seeing through.350
Of course, it is worthwhile to recognize that, despite a
steadfast nineteen-month holdout, IOAT’s struggle against the
federal government was doomed from the outset, especially
as it pertained to winning outright title to Alcatraz. Although
activists such as Joe Bill promised “a good fight” in the event
that the federal government tried to expel the occupiers, IOAT’s
takeover was, from its beginning, operating on borrowed time.351
As explained by Brad Patterson, special assistant to President
Richard Nixon, federal authorities were “never going to build
a university on Alcatraz or give [the occupiers] $300,000 for a
cultural [complex] or even give them title to Alcatraz…This was
not anything [they] were going to do.”352 Mr. Hannon, who,
although having jested with Oakes during their November 1969
encounter, awards credence to Patterson’s position in a December
1969 interview, where he coldly describes himself as “not at all”
willing to let the Alcatraz activists remain on the island.353
Yet, even with the U.S. marshals’ 1971 intervention,
Indians’ discontent with federal oversight and the quality of life
that came with it had reached an unmistakable breaking point.
In an ironic precursor to the 1969 invasion, a citizens’ coalition
in San Francisco declared that same year that Alcatraz’s sale
would lead to its commercialization and end as one of the “true
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gems in…[the] Bay Area.”354 When questioned as to why it had
taken the group over two years to form, the coalition’s spokesman
asserted that resistance movements “never form until a crisis point
is reached.”355 For Alcatraz’s Indian occupiers, the crisis point for
Native American livelihood had been mounting decades if not
centuries prior to November ’69. The events of November 10
and 20, 1969, do not, in other words, reflect some newfound
aversion to the injustices being imposed on Native Americans.
Rather, they are indicative of the sense that Indigenous welfare
and culture would grow unsalvageable so long as there wasn’t
large-scale action. A “dead rock” so far as it remained owned and
operated by white Americans, Alcatraz represented an ideal means
for Native Americans to “reexamine their acquiescence to the
non-Indian world” in the event that they could build upon it.356
In never receiving title to the Rock, IOAT’s hope of transforming
America’s Devil Island into a symbol of Indian prosperity fell
by the wayside, but its passion for Indigenous pride would be
repeatedly resurrected in the years that followed.
The resurgence of IOAT’s call for Native American
advancement presented itself early and often in the 1970s,
beginning with a press conference on the eve of the last fifteen
Alcatraz occupiers’ removal. It was here that John Trudell, after
being asked whether the protestors’ arrest meant defeat for Indian
activism, broadly smiled and exclaimed: “Nah, man, there is no
such thing as defeat! We’re going to bandage up the bruises and
stand up again. [The government] didn’t beat us!”357 Trudell’s
comment could not be more accurate given how, just a little more
than a year after the takeover’s end, approximately five hundred
Indian activists occupied the BIA building in Washington D.C.
for six days.358 Organized in part by Clyde Bellecourt, who had
communicated with Oakes concerning the Alcatraz occupiers’
security, the building’s taking spawned from the caravanning
of Native Americans to D.C. to protest poor Indigenous living
conditions and unwanted federal influence in Indian affairs.359
Then, only a few months after the BIA occupation, some two
hundred Native American activists occupied the town of
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Wounded Knee, South Dakota, out of disgust for corruption on
the Pine Ridge Reservation and the failure of the U.S. government
to respect treaties made with Indigenous peoples.360 Although
succumbing after seventy-one days to a coalition of FBI officers
and U.S. marshals, the Wounded Knee occupation was far from
the final Indigenous protest of its era as over five thousand Indian
activists participated in the 1978 “Longest Walk” on Washington
D.C.361 Launched in opposition to legislation jeopardizing
Indian land and water rights, the march on Washington began
with an inaugural ceremony on Alcatraz, the site where Indian
activists had promised the beginning of a “new Indian life and
philosophy” based upon uniting Indigenous voices and making
them heard.362 As described by Bellecourt, Alcatraz, regardless
of IOAT’s failure to secure ownership of the island, remains
indisputable in providing the model and networks needed to
mobilize Indians in 1972, ’73, and ’78.363 Alcatraz’s reclamation
by the federal government may have ended Indian activism on
the Rock, but IOAT’s move against a political system slow to
respond to Indian needs ignited a movement which activist Peter
Blue Cloud promised would “encompass the world.”364
The Alcatraz occupation’s legacy as the event which
inaugurated a decade of Native American Red Power is certainly
fitting but, at times, emphasized to a fault. Unapologetic in
their critiques of the federal government and their willingness
to translate them into action, Alcatraz’s occupiers became an
inspiration to Indians disillusioned with their lowly status, but
uncertain over whether to challenge it. Yet, the very fact that
the occupiers and the activists who followed in their footsteps
were experiencing anger and confusion prior to their protests
affirms Wilma Mankiller’s description of Indian pride as “a
very low flame” that, although contained for decades, was relit
by Alcatraz.365 The ‘69 takeover indeed ignited an era of Indian
pride and resistance, but the kindling upon which it raged is too
often forgotten in examining the upheavals it created. While
historians such as Shreve, Strange, Loo, Rosier, Smith, Johnson,
and Nagel have been sure to acknowledge Alcatraz’s occupation
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as not having arisen spontaneously, the motivations that fueled
the protest are too often glossed over and described as broadly as
“brewing for decades” or “[going back] quite some time.”366
Instead, the grievances which inspired a protest of
Alcatraz’s magnitude deserve recognition as specific to midtwentieth century Indian welfare, encompassing both the socioeconomic status of Native Americans and the seemingly endless
struggle of Indigenous peoples to maintain their Indianness. As
it pertains to socio-economic status, Alcatraz’s occupiers viewed
destitute Indian reservations, their termination through federal
policy, and the relocation of Indigenous peoples in urban areas
as central to their financial and social struggles. The dying of
Indigenous culture, meanwhile, was attributed by IOAT to a
white American society that was, at its mildest, apathetic to the
survival of Indian lifeways. Adopting much of the Black Panther
Party’s rhetoric and resistance tactics, the Alcatraz occupiers
took specific aim at the BIA’s oversight of Indian education, the
overwhelming odds that tribes faced against state and federal
governments, and white Americans’ patronization of Indigenous
culture. These critiques, which stemmed from the conviction
that Indigenous lifeways would whither if exposed to mainstream
American society, led IOAT to administer the island in a
manner encouraging of Native customs and dismissive of white
influence. All this considered, discussion of the ’69 takeover and
the era of Indian activism that it ushered in grows increasingly
one-dimensional without sufficient mention of the activists’
motivations. Alcatraz’s occupation may be the beginning of a
large-scale movement, but it’s culmination of decades of silent
American Indian frustration is equally irrefutable.
In a December 1989 episode of Bay Sunday, a San
Francisco talk show hosted by Barbara Rodgers, former Alcatraz
occupier Sacheen LittleFeather affirms the ’69 occupation as an
event whose inspirations were not only complex but mounting
steadily in the years preceding the Rock’s takeover.367 The piece,
which features the two women in a well-furnished studio, shows
LittleFeather responding to whether a certain “rallying cry”
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inspired her to participate in the takeover.368 Likely aware that
such a question could not be answered so specifically let alone in
the course of a five-minute interview, LittleFeather opts to explain
a Hopi prophecy which describes Native Americans receiving a
“sign of Red Power” in the Pacific ocean.369 This sign is to mark
the beginning of a new era of Native American prosperity, but
before Indians can observe it, they have to be driven all the way
from the East Coast of the United States to the West Coast.370
Not surprisingly, LittleFeather identifies Alcatraz as this symbol
and thus the fulfillment of the prophecy, but her mentioning the
tribulation that Indians have to endure beforehand alludes to the
’69 takeover’s lead-up being as far-reaching as its aftermath.371 Just
as the Indians in the Hopi prophecy encounter hardship before
revival, those responsible for Alcatraz’s takeover were plagued
by a wide range of misfortunes leading up to their movement.
Although LittleFeather does not mention the struggles that this
work cites as primarily responsible for the occupation, her fellow
occupiers and other Indigenous activists repeatedly do. These
grievances brought Native American activism to unprecedented
heights in the 1970s, but the effort to salvage Indian livelihood
that began in San Francisco Bay would never have taken
place had Indigenous peoples not been driven there out of
desperation. Alcatraz’s occupation is, in other words, as two-fold
as LittleFeather’s prophecy, and no understanding of the event’s
outpouring of Indigenous pride will ever be complete unless one
considers how it arrived there in the first place.

Indian activists on Alcatraz in 1970
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